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How do you define "success" in a negotiated settlement? The following case study defines it as "Crest
St"- a low income neighborhood moved out of the way of a highway in Durham, North Carolina. Although
the parties didn't immediately concur with this appelation, their smiles belie their sense of pride in the
outcome.
The Crest Street area in Durham, North Caro-
lina, is an established, low-income, black neigh-
borhood typical of many found in southern cities.
It is intergenerational, with relatives exchanging
greetings daily, small truck gardens, and the kind
of house style that lends itself to porch-sitting.
Nonetheless, an outsider merely passing through
may not give it a second thought. But a strong sense
of community makes Crest Street very important
to many people.
In 1981, Crest Street had the look of a neighbor-
hood low on the list of the city's agenda. The streets
were in disrepair and houses had been run-down
and abandoned. Indeed, the city had something dif-
ferent in store for the area - an expressway. There
was an urgent demand for highway expansion, and
Crest Street was slated for destruction.
A year later, on December 15, 1982, the City of
Durham, the North Carolina Department of Trans-
portation (NCDOT) and the Crest Street Commu-
nity Council agreed on a mitigation plan that would
relocate the entire neighborhood. Since 1959, the
NCDOT had planned to extend the Durham East-
West Expressway to U.S. 15-501. The proposed route
travels just north of Duke University and the Vet-
eran's Administration Hospital. This article docu-
ments the success of the relocation project by detail-
ing the negotiation process.
The article is divided into four parts. Part I pre-
sents the prenegotiation phase, addressing the issues,
objectives, and institutional constraints faced by
each of the stakeholders. Part II, the negotiation
phase, discusses the techniques used, stages of the
process, alternatives generated, and the resulting
settlement. Post settlement is discussed in Part III,
presenting the implementation and monitoring of
the program, while Part IV presents an analysis of
the negotiation process based on some evaluatory
criteria.
I. The Pre-negotiation Phase.
The major participants in the negotiation included
the City of Durham (City), the Crest Street Com-
munity Council (Council), the North Carolina
Department of Transportation (NCDOT), Duke
University (Duke), and the Federal Highway Admin-
istration (FHWA). Outside groups also active at
various stages of the negotiations included Durham
County, the Durham Committee on the Affairs of
Black People, the People's Alliance, and the Durham
Voter's Alliance.
After the project's proposal in 1959, the City and
the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) showed reluctance in granting funds
until a decision was made on the Expressway. Con-
sequently, this placed the City of Durham in an
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A typical Crest Street residence prior to 1984.
early opposition
participation plans
awkward position. They lacked the necessary re-
sources to provide assistance to the Crest Street
residents for improvements, and they saw the need
for an Expressway to alleviate traffic circulation
problems within the City. The City's support for the
proposed expressway was, as proposed, in conflict
with the neighborhood's desire to remain a cohesive
community with adequate living conditions. Minor
street improvements (approximately $50,000 worth)
were finally approved a few years prior to the relo-
cation of the neighborhood.
Opposition to the "Crest Street" portion of the Ex-
pressway began as early as 1972, when a suit was
brought to enjoin construction based on violations
of the North Carolina Equal Protection Act. In 1973,
District Court granted a preliminary injunction.
These legal activities took place prior to the forma-
tion of the Crest Street Community Council in 1975.
The First Attempt.
In 1978, the City Council directed the staff to
prepare a relocation plan for the Crest Street
neighborhood. General data on the neighborhood
was collected and a Citizen Participation Plan de-
vised to involve citizens in the rehousing plan. The
plan was never implemented. In retrospect, partici-
pants feel that the failure to implement the Citizen
Participation Plan was mainly due to the plan's em-
phasis on broad representation. As meetings be-
tween the parties progressed, it was found that a
limited perspective provided by a few citizens who
had already gained respect and support from the
neighborhood could best serve the community's
interest.
Around the same time as the failed Citizen's Par-
ticipation Plan, the Crest Street Community Council
filed an Administrative Complaint with the United
States Department of Transportation. The complaint
proposed that routing of the expressway by the
North Carolina Department of Transportation was
an act of racial discrimination against the neigh-
borhood. Very soon thereafter all work ceased when
the City Council voted against the Expressway. But
after the elections, the new City Council reinstated
the plan, made it a top priority, and began to exert
pressure on the NCDOT and Governor's Office for
assistance in the relocation of the Crest Street
Community.
In 1980, the USDOT advised the State that con-
struction of the expressway would violate the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, thus validating the Administra-
tive Complaint. After debating for ten years, all
stakeholders began to push for a negotiated settle-
ment. Time, attitude, and resources were the major
factors in pushing all parties to begin to negotiate
an agreement.
II. The Negotiation Phases.
There were essentially two phases to the negotia-
tion process. After the USDOT informed the State
that the administrative complaint was valid, the
City, FHWA, and the NCDOT met to come up with
a plan of action. A Steering Committee was formed,
comprised of top officials from each interested party:
the NCDOT, FHWA, City, County, the Crest Street
Community Council, Durham Committee on the
Affairs of Black People, Duke University and the
People's Alliance. The formation of the committee
occured on April of 1980, with the first meeting in
June of that year.
The Steering Committee was essentially the first
phase of the negotiation process. One of their
primary undertakings was to appoint a task force
to study the neighborhood. Task force members, as
opposed to Steering Committee members, were not
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elected officials or particularly visible representa-
tives for their respective agencies. As mid-level ad-
ministrators and technicians, the first assignment of
the task force was to coordinate a survey of Crest
Street residents so that opinions on various issues
could be compiled. Besides appointment of the task
force, the Steering Committee reviewed five alter-
native routings of the freeway generated by the
NCDOT.
One can surmise from the minutes and opinions
expressed during this time that positional bargain-
ing, posturing, and bad faith negotiations were the
rule, rather than the exception during this first phase
of negotiations. Power relationships were estab-
lished at the expense of a negotiated settelement.
The steering committee was unable to move beyond
their political posturing, and the first phase ended
when the City Council rezoned some property ad-
jacent to the neighborhood from "residential" to
"commercial" on November 10, 1980. The neighbor-
hood notified the Department of Highways that they
were reassessing their role in the Steering Commit-
tee and would not participate in a task force meeting
scheduled for November 24th.
At this point, a ten month impasse began during
which a series of separate meetings were held be-
tween the NCDOT and the other parties. The
NCDOT reassessed their role in the negotiations and
identified alternative courses of action in January
of 1981. Essentially, they had three: (1) drop the
project - a politically and economically costly alter-
native; (2) push the project through and run the risk
of losing good relations with all parties, including
the FHWA, and eventually going to court over the
project; or (3) negotiate a settlement. Of the three
alternatives, the latter was the most desireable.
Between January and October of 1981, each of
the major parties to the conflict met separately with
the NCDOT. Basically, the NCDCT's aim was to get
the neighborhood and the City to resolve their dif-
ferences. On October 15, a full meeting of the task
force took place, signaling a new phase of the
negotiations. Although the same parties represent-
ing the same interests were there, members of the
politically visible Steering Committee no longer
participated.
Power Relationships.
When the task force reconvened, the relationship
between the members were significantly different.
Most of this change can be attributed to the legiti-
macy the neighborhood gained by virtue of the pre-
liminarily successful Administrative Complaint filed
with the USDOT and of the 1980 Steering Commit-
tee walk-out in protest of city actions.
Significant in this new round of meetings was the
relative lack of any power struggles between the par-
ties. The task force saw the Expressway extension
as a problem to be solved by team effort. Conse-
quently, it was at this point that the personalities
of the task force members really aided in negotiating
a settlement. As one interviewee put it, "the chem-
istry was just right for a settlement." The staff from
the City and the NCDOT ended up working closely
together to solve the problem. The Council clarified
that they were only opposed to the effects of the
freeway extension, and not to the freeway itself. This
made it possible for genuine progress to commence.
The FHWA played a vital role on these sessions by
interpreting the laws governing NCDOT conduct
broadly so that solutions could be generated.
Second phase negotiations took place from Oc-
tober of 1981 to December of 1982. Meetings were
held two to three times a month. The negotiators
themselves had severe time constraints that gave the
proceedings a sense of urgency— a factor that aided
the settlement.
During the course of the second phase of the
negotiations, an approximate three year time table
was imposed on the agreement. This greatly aided
all the parties in ensuring prompt and timely com-
pliance with settlement provisions.
In the beginning of the negotiations, the NCDOT
suffered from a poor image in the eyes of the Crest
Street Community Council, and not without reason,
based on the precedent set when the Expressway
displaced a similar community in the late 1960s.
This bias had to be resolved before the negotiations
could continue successfully. However, as a result of
the meetings between the Council and the NCDOT,
the Council's attitude toward the NCDOT changed,
and the neighborhood realized the NCDOT was
willing to work with them.
Strategies and Alternatives Generated.
Despite the willingness of the parties to work
together during this second phase of negotiations,
their sense of urgency, and their respect for the con-
cerns of each actor, the mitigation plan and the
negotiated settlement would never have been signed
if some key events had not occurred. Primary
among these was the state legislation approval of
the right chemistry
sense of urgency
key events
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last resort housing funds for public agencies (N.C.
General Statute §. 133-10.1). The funds, approved
in 1980, had been used before, but the NCDOT ad-
ministration had not made a habit of using them.
The flexibility shown by the NCDOT and FHWA
negotiators made it possible for those funds to be
used. If other parties had been involved, it is quite
possible that those funds may have never been utiliz-
ed, and consequently, no settlement reached.
Another significant event concerned the amount
new design ideas of land needed to build the interchange. This became
a major problem in resolving the dispute. About the
time the negotiations were underway, a new inter-
change concept, called the "urban diamond" was be-
ing tested in Florida. It's attractiveness was due to
its conservative use of land as compared to contem-
porary interchange designs, allowing the interchange
to be "squeezed" onto significantly less acreage.
Subsequently, this design was incorporated into the
Crest Street plan.
The NCDOT, because it was able to use last resort
housing funds, waived the usual requirement that
the City acquire a share of the right-of-way for a
major state roadway within it's bounds. This waiver
freed money for rehabilitation and relocation, and
encouraged cost-sharing efforts between the City
and the NCDOT. This decision by NCDOT was a
significant break through in the negotiations. Previ-
ously, the City had a "bottom line" for monies to
be used for Crest Street Neighborhood improve-
ments, which was not barely enough to complete
the needed rehabilitation for the neighborhood.
A litany of route alternatives were produced
throughout both phases of the negotiation process.
All but one was introduced by the NCDOT. By
December 1981, three alternatives had been tenta-
tively selected. At this point, the neighborhood
demanded that a mitigation plan accompany each
alternative. The mitigation plans were formulated
and eventually a revised version of the best alter-
native was adopted by the parties. In general, each
alternative route and respective mitigation plan was
reviewed, then relative strengths and weaknesses
were discussed to arrive at the selected agreement.
Before. . .an abandoned school
Outcome Settlement.
The mitigation plan signed by the Durham City
Council, the NCDOT and the Crest Street Commu-
nity Council contains the mitigation efforts proposed
by the above parties, and input from the FHWA.
Funds used for the relocation project included
general revenue bonds, Section 8 New Construction,
Section 202, Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation, and
Community Development Block Grants. In one
area, the NCDOT paid all costs within the Express-
way corridor, with area activities cost shared be-
tween the State DOT (% of the costs) and the City
(V3 of the costs). Commercial redevelopment is pro-
posed for part of the City's land, with costs paid
by the City and proceeds from sales shared by
NCDOT and the City of Durham.
Construction and rehabilitation of dwelling units
consists of the following:
65 houses rehabilitated (moved)
21 units in Hicks Elementary School rehabilitated
(moved)
8 condominiums rehabilitated in place
12 new single family homes
45 Crestview Apartments
4 houses rehabilitated in place.
Recreation facilities include a park, baseball field,
and a community center. The NCDOT is responsible
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for construction of a noise abatement wall and land-
scaping along the right-of-way.
In order to accomplish the relocation project, the
City and NCDOT agreed to offer relocation assist-
ance benefits (which includes last resort housing
benefits) for all displaced Crest Street residents.
Relocatees had basically three options under the last
resort housing provision: (1) to remain owner-
occupants and purchase a replacement dwelling with
relocation assistance based on rehabilitation costs,
mortgage costs, cost of property acquisition, and
fair market value of the existing lot; (2) to remain
as tenants eligible for rental assistance payments,
through state funding (last resort housing) and/or
federal assistance (Section 202 federal loans); or (3)
to convert from tenant to home-owner through
deferred mortgage loans provided by the City.
Both the City and the NCDOT agreed to assist
the community with grant and subsidy applications.
Today, the relocation assistance has resulted in an
i increase in home ownership from 15% to almost
90% of the Crest Street residents.
A second plan, the Crest Street Community Rede-
velopment Plan, completed by the city on March
31, 1983, provides a more detailed description of
the overall agreement, indicating project costs, proj-
ect proposals, and steps for implementation.
III. Post Settlement Phase.
Task Force meetings continued once a week for
almost two years. Presently, meetings are held once
a month at City Hall. The parties now attending
the negotiations include one neighborhood represen-
tative, and two representatives from both the City
and the NCDOT. Sometimes an auditor or other in-
terested party attends. All problems and progress
reports are discussed at the meeting.
Presently, the relocation of residents is complete.
Most relocatees have chosen to own their own home
as opposed to renting it, and also have chosen
renovation over newly built homes. City costs have
exceeded earlier estimates, and are up to $4.9 million
i as a result of neighborhood preferences and ill-
advised land appraisals.
The relocation site continues to be under enor-
mous growth pressure. A portion of the potential
relocation land was sold during the negotiation pro-
cess to establish a racquet ball club. Currently, the
VA Hospital located directly south of the relocation
site wants to lease some property to build a five level
parking deck. It is also anticipated that this property
After. . . a new senior center.
will appreciate considerably as a result of the East-
West Expressway.
Post Settlement-Settlement.
The NCDOT placed a renovated house /office near
the site to facilitate relocation. They maintained a
staff that worked closely with the City in improving
the site and coordinating financing for the residents.
They also coordinated all construction and moving
of structures. The City and the NCDOT have a
maintenance agreement for landscaping, site im-
provements, and infrastructure.
Few changes have been made to the original Rede-
velopment Plan and Municipal Agreement. Largely
due to the combined efforts of all parties in prevent-
ing further amendments and hence further complica-
tions to the project, those changes that have been
made have been relatively minor. For instance, due
to the number of people who wish to own their own
home rather than to rent, the apartments planned
were changed into condominiuns.
important factors
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essential parties
crucial considerations
Evaluation
Jim Arthur, as a mediator for the New England
Mediation Institute, has had extensive experience in
dealing with parties to development disputes and in
working with those parties to bring about a mutual-
ly acceptable resolution. At a recent session as a
guest lecturer at the U.N.C. School of Law, he was
asked to identify factors he felt to be essential to suc-
cessful negotiation. He identified six factors: (1)
agreement on the essential parties involved in the
dispute; (2) agreement on what the critical issues at
hand are; (3) a balance of power between the essen-
tial parties involved in the negotiations; (4) a sense
of urgency to settle among the parties; (5) flexibility
as to an acceptable settlement; and (6) uncertainty
regarding the ultimate correctness of the course of
action being pursued by each party.
These criteria are similar to factors identified by
others in the field of mediation. As a tool for
evaluating negotiation success, criteria can identify
factors that aid and hinder negotiations. This pro-
vides a means of learning how to improve the nego-
tiation process.
Agreement of Essential Parties.
The old adage "too many cooks spoil the broth"
is as applicable to negotiated settlement as it is to
the culinary arts. If too many parties are involved
in an attempt to resolve a dispute, negotiations may
become so complex that final settlement is impos-
sible. Furthermore, successful implementation of a
negotiated settlement is only possible if all parties
critical to the settlement are involved in the negotia-
tion process.
Resolution of the Crest Street dispute involved
paring down the number of parties from those mere-
ly interested to those essential to implementation of
the agreement. During the two years in which
negotiations took place, no fewer than nine separate
groups were, at various times, offered the oppor-
tunity to participate in the negotiations. However,
all parties eventually realized that no more than five
of these groups were vital to the success of the
negotiated outcome. Therefore, the task force who
forged the final mitigation plan were: (1) the City,
whose municipal limits included both the Crest
Street Neighborhood and the proposed Expressway
segment; (2) the NCDOT, which served as project
overseer and final authority over the proposed
freeway; (3) the Council, whose members repre-
sented the neighborhood to be displaced; (4) Duke
University, which was a major landowner of prop-
erties adjoining the neighborhood relocation area;
and (5) the FHWA, a sort of de facto mediator early
on in the process, which represented the substantial
federal interests (both legal and monetary) in the
dispute resolution. It was soon evident that only
three parties — the City, the Council, and the
NCDOT— were essential to the resolution and im-
plementation of the final mitigation plan. Only
these parties signed the final agreement.
Critical Issues.
Just as it is important to include all parties perti-
nent to the final agreement, it is also critical that
the negotiators are in accord about the issues at
hand. The inherent nature of the Crest Street con-
flict dictated clarity. Can a state route a much need-
ed highway through a poor, close-knit community,
when no viable alternative exists? This was the issue
recognized by all three parties. But even though this
was recognized early by all the major parties in-
volved, the interests held by each major participant
biased perceptions and coloured interpretations of
the major issue.
On the one hand, the City in 1979 received what
was essentially a mandate from the electorate that
the East-West Expressway was to be completed at
any social or economic cost. This was a major plank
in the platform of the mayor and many of the coun-
cil members elected at the time. The Crest Street
Community, meanwhile, had watched the physical
condition of the neighborhood deteriorate steadily
over the years. City aid and reparation services
diminished, due presumably to the belief that the
neighborhood was "on its way out." On the other
hand, the routing was subject to the constraints of
relatively intense commercial, industrial, and insti-
tutional development in West Durham, so the
NCDOT had little real political or economic choice
in proposing the freeway corridor as it did.
It was only when the individual interests of each
major party to the dispute were recognized by the
other principals as legitimate that the parties were
able to view the major issues in the same light, plac-
ing the negotiations in a perspective capable of ren-
dering them at least potentially successful. This
ability to "see the other side" was brought on by two
factors. (1) the attainment of power and legitimacy
by the essential parties, and (2) moving the negotia-
<f
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: Neighborhood residents and NCDOT officials at a house closing.
tions from the politically visible steering commit-
tee to the less visible task force. A balance of power,
i
1
critical to issue recognition and good faith effort,
existed.
Balance of Power.
Both in the context of focusing attention on the
critical issues involved in a dispute, and of guaran-
teeing that each party's interests are considered fair-
ly, the balance of power among parties attempting
to negotiate a dispute settlement is essential. Given
the very political nature of the setting surrounding
the Crest Street neighborhood conflict, it is probable
that there would have been no negotiated settlement
had each major actor in the dispute not posessed
legitimacy. And with legitimacy came the power
represented by status substantially equal to that of
the other parties involved.
Each party derived its power somewhat different-
ly. The State of North Carolina, as represented by
the DOT here, possessed a number of powers. One
was its legal authority as the instrument of the State,
wherein it could utilize eminent domain. With this
power it could move pretty much whomever and
whatever it needed, while compensating those
moved fairly, in order to secure right-of-way for a
public thoroughfare. Further, the NCDOT posessed
the "power of the purse." As such, within its
statutory authority, it was able to finance the Ex-
pressway by whatever means were suitable and
necessary. Indeed, it was this very power relative
to legislative authorization for last resort housing
payments in 1981 (N.C. General Statutes 133-10.1)
which was viewed by all parties as a major turning
point in negotiations. Yet, the State's powers were
not limitless, as a 1980 advisory memo from the
USDOT Director of Civil Rights advising the State
DOT pointed out.
The City's power was also multi-dimensional.
With its zoning power the City was able to tighten-
or loosen — the noose around the neck of the neigh-
borhood. Of even greater importance was the
derivative power of the City conferred upon by the
voters, who clearly stated their desire that the
freeway be quickly completed in the 1979 city elec-
tions. Nevertheless, like the powers of the other state
arm — the NCDOT— both of these powers are legally
constrained (zoning designations, for example, can-
not be arbitrary) and politically constrained (as
city power
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specific interests
much uncertainty
when the Council withdrew from the negotiations
in November of 1980 when the Durham City Coun-
cil was perceived as acting in bad faith in rezoning
a residential neighborhood parcel as commercial).
The ultimate power of the Council was largely de
facto, deriving from two incidents alluded to above.
The Council's September 1978 filing of an Admin-
istrative Complaint with the USDCTT alleging racial
discrimination, and subsequent preliminary agree-
ment on the matter by the USDOT, established the
Council as a power to be reckoned with. Absent
some intervening event, at the very least the State
was subjecting itself to the burden and expense of
future litigation; at the most, the Council had the
potential ability to preclude the disputed expressway
segment altogether. In the negotiations that ensued
after this event, Council's act of terminating negotia-
tions when the City acted in bad faith in the rezon-
ing incident made it clear that Council had no inten-
tions of "lying down and playing dead," but would
have to be dealt with as an equal. But as with the
other parties, the Council's powers were not
absolute — the act of walking out of the negotiations
could well have resulted in the final breakdown of
negotiations, with no guarantee that the verdict of
the racial discrimination complaint would be in their
favor.
The effect of the substantial, but not unrestricted,
powers possessed by each party to the negotiations
was to create a climate wherein each side was likely
to give due consideration to the views and interests
of other parties, in order to have that courtesy recip-
rocated. Moreover, the balance of power existing —
where no clear winner was likely to emerge via any
non-negotiated settlement route — greatly increased
the likelihood and desirability of a negotiated settle-
ment on the Crest Street case.
A Sense of Urgency.
The sense of urgency for a relatively quick settle-
ment placed upon each of the parties by the chro-
nology of events that took place before and during
the negotiations aided the agreement. In the City's
case, the electorate had made it clear that it wanted
the Expressway finished quickly. Traffic congestion
in West Durham was worsening, and continuation
of an unresolved situation created a political liability
for the City Administration. All of these facts and
events helped to spur the parties toward a negotiated
settlement, but there was a single factor which, in
the end, was one of the most important catalysts
for the February 1982 final settlement. When the
negotiations began, the City of Durham had already
been allocated HUD monies to rehabilitate as many
as 75 low-income rental units plus 20-year rent sub-
sidies for those units. Durham had already con-
sidered and rejected a number of locations for these
units, and unless they (or some portion of them)
were placed by March of 1982, the allocation was
to be withdrawn by HUD. So when the chance to
utilize those allocated monies presented itself in the
Crest Street case, the parties seized the opportunity
and carried on marathon negotiation sessions in
order to beat the HUD-imposed deadline for use of
the subsidized housing funds.
With respect to the NCDCTT, the Department had
already invested tremendous sums of time and
money in planning and in overseeing completion of
approximately 60% of the East-West Expressway.
Consequently, it could hardly back away from the
proposed "Crest Street" freeway segment. And every
delay in the construction schedule pushed up the
final cost of the project a little more.
For its part, the Council knew that no improve-
ments were going to be made to its neighborhood
by the City until and unless the Expressway prob-
lem was resolved. Further, the Council feared to be
out of step with the conservative national trend then
occurring relative to the dispute. The USDOT offi-
cials, who had advised the NCDCTT that its pro-
posed plan for the Expressway probably violated the
civil rights of the Crest Street Community citizens,
had served under President Carter. By 1981, new
officials were in place that might have reversed the
advisory opinion on the Administrative Complaint
filed by the Council. Thus, the Council, as well as
the City of Durham and the State DOT, felt pres-
sured by factors beyond their control to act in
resolving the Crest Street conflict as quickly as was
judiciously possible.
Uncertainty.
Sometimes, when a party involved in a conflict
maintains an almost irrational belief in its course
of action as "the only right course," a negotiated
settlement becomes impossible. But where some
uncertainty exists as to the correctness of the chosen
course being pursued by any individual party, that
lack of assuredness can be seized upon by the nego-
tiation process to bring the parties toward some
more central, mutually agreeable compromise. Lack
of certainty in this context means only that a party
is unsure as to the most correct course to achieve
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its objectives, and not that the party lacks convic-
tion as to those objectives.
In the Crest Street negotiations, each party had
specific interests in mind, but uncertainty existed as
to how to best realize those interests. The City, for
example, clearly wanted the East-West Expressway
completed for economic and political reasons. But
the City was unsure as to whether it was essential
to displace the Crest Street neighborhood in the first
place, and if so, how to mitigate such massive com-
munity disruption. For the NCDOT as well, there
were political risks and associated costs related to
the conflict which resulted in uncertainty. NCDOT
was used to getting things done, and from an in-
vestment standpoint needed to finish the proposed
Expressway segment as quickly as possible. Yet,
while they were more insulated from the repercus-
sions of displacing the Crest Street Community than
the City, the State Administration in power at the
time had a very real interest in minimizing the social
and political impact of displacement. The subse-
quent dilemma for NCDOT— whether to push for-
ward as planned, or put things on hold until a viable
alternative proposal could be derived — was fraught
with uncertainty as to: (1) how much time and
money to spend developing new alternative designs
for the freeway in order to mitigate its social im-
pacts, (2) the role the State should play in reloca-
tion of displaced residents (both administratively
and financially), and (3) its role in relation to the
desires and authority of the City in the dispute.
The Council wanted both to maintain the integrity
of the Crest Street Community and to improve the
quality of life for its residents. But even with what
appeared to be a strong case of racial discrimination
against the State, the Council was unsure whether
stopping the freeway altogether was the proper path
to pursue. After all, Durham did need the Express-
way to improve traffic flow and relieve congestion
in the western portions of the City (including the
Crest Street area), no truly viable alternative route
for the freeway existed, and putting a halt to Ex-
pressway construction in no way assured the neigh-
borhood of any improvements.
The net result was that the inherent uncertainty
among the major actors in the Crest Street dispute
contributed to a climate conducive to a successful
1
resolution of the conflict. The final mitigation agree-
ment replaced the uncertainty experienced by each
side with assurances safeguarding the best interests
of all major parties in the Crest Street conflict.
Celebrating a new Crest Street.
Flexibility.
It is self-evident that settlement of a dispute is
enhanced where flexibility as to the resolution of
pivotal issues exists, since this allows a whole range
of potential outcomes from which a mutually ac-
ceptable choice may be selected. In the Crest Street
case it would be fair to say that by the time negotia-
tions began, all essential parties believed in the reali-
ty, if not the necessity, of both constructing the Crest
Street segment of the East-West Expressway and the
relocating of the Crest Street neighborhood as a
community. And as the case history discussion
makes clear, a number of alternative ways existed
wherein these priorities might be accomplished.
That alternative chosen was the plan that proved
to be the most acceptable to the respective constitu-
encies represented by each of the negotiators. This
was a way of using flexibility in a non-threatening
manner.
Conclusion
The essentially successful nature of the Crest
Street negotiation can be summed up in one statis-
tic Before the relocation, 15% of the residents were
owners. After the relocation, 94% of the residents
were owners. On May 3, 1986, all of the parties met
to celebrate their success at the New Bethel Baptist
Church. Joy and satisfaction emanated from every
face. The most telling hallmark of a successful
negotiation — lasting goodwill on the part of all
parties — was displayed by the entire neighborhood.
*
